Come May 31, Malaysia and the People's Republic of China will commemorate the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

On that day in 1974, then prime minister Tun Abdul Razak and his Chinese counterpart Chou En-Lai finalised and formalised the act in Beijing. This ended an era of Malaysia's pro-West and anti-China foreign and defence policy that stretched from 1957 to 1970 which coincided with the administration of the first premier Tunku Abdul Rahman.

Given the general black-and-white impression laid down by the Cold War as well as the war of national liberation in Vietnam, the Malaysian move has been popularly seen as a radical, fundamental and even defiant shift from the Western alliance.

However, it is also now clear that the relations in the 1970s between communist China and the US-led Western alliance were not that bipolar either. Britain, for example, had already recognised the then new regime in Beijing on January1950, although mutual distrust remained behind the scene and despite US's more confrontational attitude in the period between 1950 and 1970.

In Feb 1972, US President Richard Nixon also visited Beijing and later in the same month, a Shanghai Communique was signed and published by the US and China as the first step to normalise Sino-US relations and to build an anti-Soviet understanding. Earlier in the mid-1960s, the split between China and the Soviet Union had already become public knowledge worldwide.

Seen in this historical context, the Malaysian move in 1974 might not be that radical, fundamental or defiant after all because by then, the world was no longer strictly bipolar but tripolar in the sense that while there was still a general posturing of confrontation between communism and anti-communism, there was also simultaneously an anti-Soviet Sino-US understanding.

Motivated by fear?

In a recent seminar held in Kuala Lumpur by a Malaysian think-tank on national security and international relations, a question was raised as to whether Tun Abdul Razak would have "dared" to move closer to China had US President Richard Nixon not visited Beijing earlier in 1972 and normalised US-Sino relations.

There was also a suggestion that one of the prime motives on the part of the late former premier's administration in establishing diplomatic relations was the fear of the loss of American power, influence and prestige in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam in 1968 as well as the 1969 Nixon Doctrine which outlined a new US policy for Southeast Asia.

According to the doctrine, the United States was no longer prepared to commit any US ground troops in any conflicts in Southeast Asia, although it would still honour all its treaty obligations by indirectly supporting allies and friends through economic and military aids.

As the Vietnamese forces for national liberation increasingly gained strengths leading to victories in the early 1970s, the fear of Domino Theory also intensified on the part of non-communist Southeast Asia, particularly Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore. With decreased and non-automatic US commitment as outlined in the 1969 Nixon Doctrine, befriending China was probably seen as the most critical option for survival in the then seemingly unstoppable fall of one domino after another.

In other words, besides the romantic, idealistic or altruistic reasons as normally advertised by Malaysia and China, there seemed to be an element of desperate realism to jump on the winning bandwagon, at least for a moment, on the part of the Malaysian foreign policy thinkers and decision-makers at that time.

However, it must be pointed out that, in the 30 years of Malaysia-China relations, Malaysia still maintained its traditional security and defence ties with the United States, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore.

Beijing's stamp of approval

Whatever the ultimate reasons, the relations did pay dividend to Malaysia even in security terms: because of the countervailing effects of the US-China anti-Soviet understanding, the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance after communist victories in Indochina and its tendency for southward expansion were checked.

So, while Thailand served as the frontline state of the Western alliance to block Soviet-Vietnamese southward drive, Vietnam itself was frequently disrupted at its northern rear by China's cross-border military expeditions in the late 1970s.

Meanwhile, the US-led Western alliance strived to check and balance the global, especially maritime, attempt of the Soviet Union to assert its power and influence, including in the waters of South China Sea, Straits of Malacca and Indian Ocean.

Domestically, the establishment of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China served to de-legitimize the struggle of the Chinese-predominated Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and other traditional Chinese left-wing elements in both Peninsular Malaysia and Sarawak. The Malaysian government that was set up as a pro-Western, anti-China and anti-communist regime during the early period of the Cold War was eventually legitimatised by even Beijing.

The 1978 official visit of then China's vice premier Deng Xiaoping to Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Singapore and other Asean capitals to alert them of the regional threat posed by the Soviet-Vietnam alliance epitomised the new set of regional security relations. However, there was still a school of thought in Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta - known as the 1980 Kuantan Doctrine - opining that the Soviet-Vietnam alliance in Indochina was acceptable to Asean to the extent that it could be used as a counterweight and buffer against what was worried as China's southward expansionism in the longer run.

Ten years later, communist regimes worldwide faced a series of political, economic and social crises. While ruling communist parties in Eastern Europe collapsed one after another, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also had to confront the most serious challenge to its political legitimacy in May-June 1989 when thousands of students and workers held a peaceful, mammoth and prolonged demonstration in Beijing's Tiananmen Square against the government.

It ended tragically and the regime survived amidst a bloodbath in Tiananmen and moral condemnation by the international community.

In 1989, the Soviet Union and Vietnam also withdrew their troops from Afghanistan and Cambodia respectively, ending the occupations. Not insignificantly, in December that year, the governments of Malaysia and Thailand signed a peace accord with the CPM ending the armed struggle on the Malaysian-Thai border. CPM had always been said to have received support from Beijing.

China, the new threat?

In December 1991, the Soviet Union imploded and the Cold War ended. Ironically, while the Domino Theory did not work in the non-communist Southeast Asia, it operated within the communist realm in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union.

For 10 years in between the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the war-like terrorist attacks on Sept 11, 2001, some quarters in the Western security and defence communities argued that a resurgent and revitalised China now posed a threat in a new Cold War.

The passion of these China-threat arguments receded after the Sept 11 incident as the United States and its allies have become preoccupied with their war against terrorism. However, these China-threat arguments survive and still circulate, albeit with lower intensity.

In conjunction with the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and China, malaysiakini spoke to one of the most active, persistent and passionate Malaysian advocates for closer Malaysia-China relations, Tan Kai Hee.

Tan, was a former secretary-general of the now defunct multiethnic opposition coalition, Socialist Front and an ex-ISA detainee. He is now a prominent businessman and secretary of the non-government Malaysia-China Friendship Association whose patrons include former premier Dr Mahathir Mohamad.

In the interview, Tan not only commended Mahathir and his successor Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, but also former deputy prime minister Anwar Ibrahim, for their contribution to the promotion of closer relations between Malaysia and China over the years.

However, he also conceded that publicised crimes involving Chinese nationals in Malaysia, has given the former a negative image here.

[ Part 2 to follow]

JAMES WONG WING ON is chief analyst of Strategic Analysis Malaysia (SAM). Wong is a former DAP member of parliament for Kampar (1990-1995) and a former columnist for the Sin Chew Jit Poh Chinese daily (now Sin Chew Daily ). He read political science and economics at the Monash University in Melbourne, Australia.