Indonesia in democratic transition (Part 2)
For many years in the past, the political role actively played by the repressive armed forces, the frequent outbreak of anti-Chinese riots and the struggle
between Islamists and secular-liberal nationalists in Indonesia have defined the international as well as regional image of Indonesian politics.What are the realities inside Indonesia now? Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar attempts to present a balanced picture.
Q : Democratisation in Indonesia since 1998 seems to have produced mixed results so far. On one hand, people have regained their human rights to freedom of speech, association and assembly and intellectuals have also been freer to express their ideas, but the newly found freedom is also said to have created a space for religious extremism and terrorism as well as regional separatism that threaten not only Indonesia but also other parts of the region. What is your opinion on these two assessments of democratisation in Indonesia?
A : It is misleading to argue that regional separatism and religious extremism in Indonesia only emerged after 1998. Indonesian history clearly shows that throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, it was wracked by civil wars, such as the regional rebellions in Aceh, West Sumatra and North Sulawesi, and the armed struggle to establish an Islamic state in Aceh, West Java and South Sulawesi. Throughout the New Order period, Aceh countinued to be a troubled province, leading to a massive military occupation of the area from the late 1980s till the fall of Suharto. Two other provinces, Papua (Irian Jaya) and East Timor also had long-standing armed rebellions against the central government.
For many years in the past, the political role actively played by the repressive armed forces, the frequent outbreak of anti-Chinese riots and the struggle
between Islamists and secular-liberal nationalists in Indonesia have defined the international as well as regional image of Indonesian politics.What are the realities inside Indonesia now? Dr Dewi Fortuna Anwar attempts to present a balanced picture.
Q : Democratisation in Indonesia since 1998 seems to have produced mixed results so far. On one hand, people have regained their human rights to freedom of speech, association and assembly and intellectuals have also been freer to express their ideas, but the newly found freedom is also said to have created a space for religious extremism and terrorism as well as regional separatism that threaten not only Indonesia but also other parts of the region. What is your opinion on these two assessments of democratisation in Indonesia?
A : It is misleading to argue that regional separatism and religious extremism in Indonesia only emerged after 1998. Indonesian history clearly shows that throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, it was wracked by civil wars, such as the regional rebellions in Aceh, West Sumatra and North Sulawesi, and the armed struggle to establish an Islamic state in Aceh, West Java and South Sulawesi. Throughout the New Order period, Aceh countinued to be a troubled province, leading to a massive military occupation of the area from the late 1980s till the fall of Suharto. Two other provinces, Papua (Irian Jaya) and East Timor also had long-standing armed rebellions against the central government.
All of these regional grievances against the central government, which have their roots in economic exploitation, political marginalisation and human rights abuses, were always met by force by the New Order government, leading to a vicious cycle of resistance and repression. It is, therefore, not surprising that once the heavy arms of the New Order government were lifted these regional problems resurfaced.
The new democratic government in Indonesia now tries to deal with these issues in a more comprehensive manner, recognising the root causes of the grievances. Both Aceh and Papua have been given a special autonomy status and both of these rich provinces can now keep much larger shares of their revenues. These comprehensive solutions are believed to be more sustainable in maintaining national unity and territorial integrity. As for religious extremism, their number has always been small and even during the New Order period there had been a number of incidents, such as the highjacking of a Garuda flight in Bangkok and the bombing of the Borobudur temple in the 1970s by a number of religious extremists. It is true that Suharto's repressive policy forced a number of radical clerics, such as Abu Bakar Bashir, to seek sanctuary in Malaysia, while Indonesia's new political freedom allowed these people to return.
Political parties based on Islam have also been allowed to exist and compete in the elections. But precisely because of the political openness, it has been demonstrated in the elections of 1999 and 2004 that parties espousing religious fundamentalism do not get popular support, while religious extremism has never found fertile soil among the mostly moderate Indonesian Muslims. Moreover, the terrorist attacks in Bali and Jakarta have alienated people further from religious extremism and led to a strong condemnation of terrorism.
Q : There had been a fear before 1998 that, without authoritarian rule ala-Suharto, Indonesia, as a fragile nation, would break up territorially. But, there is still no sign of that. What hold Indonesia together as a nation?
A : It has always been a myth to argue that Indonesia was only held together by the military and by authoritarian rule. The fact of the matter is, Indonesia came into being as a result of the development of a nationalist consciousness among the disparate ethnic groups, who, as early as 1928 declared in the Youth Pledge: 'One Country, Indonesia; One Nation, Indonesian; One Language, Bahasa Indonesia'. It was this nationalist consciousness that united the over 700 ethnic groups to fight for their independence against the Dutch colonial rule and established the Republic of Indonesia. Indonesia's long armed struggle for independence has generally fostered a strong sense of nationalism among Indonesians and a genuine attachment to the notion of 'Indonesia'.
Despite grievances against the government in many quarters, most Indonesians want to remain Indonesians, the exception being a few separatist groups in Aceh and Papua, the two most outlying provinces which have unique histories, cultures and relations with Jakarta. It is no coincidence that these two provinces are also rich in mineral resources. The total population of these two provinces are less than 3% of the total population of Indonesia.
East Timor was regarded as a special case, since it was never part of the Dutch East Indies which later became Indonesia. Given that Indonesia's annexation was never recognised by the international community, and that Jakarta faced continuous resistance from East Timor, leading to human rights abuses from the Indonesian military against the East Timorese, President Habibie in 1999 decided that the best solution was to allow the East Timorese to choose whether to remain part of Indonesia or become independent through a referendum. Such a solution is not available to the other restive provinces. As mentioned earlier, both Aceh and Papua have been granted special autonomy status.
Q : Although Indonesia has the largest number of Muslims in the world, it has so far been rather successful in resisting the demand of turning it into an Islamic state, and that a woman has also been popularly elected as the president of the republic. Why? Is there a possibility that the status quowould change?
A : Islam in Indonesia belongs to the moderate Shafiie school. When Islam arrived in Indonesia it encountered very rich and very diverse cultural traditions in different parts of the archipelago. To be accepted, Islam had had to accommodate local cultures and traditions as well, resulting in different forms and blends of cultures and religion. Thus, for instance, in West Sumatra, which is recognised to be an orthodox Muslim region, Islam has to co-exist with the long-established matri-lineal system, in which family lineage and properties are passed through the female line. Women have traditionally occupied important positions in the various cultures in Indonesia. For instance, Aceh, known for its Islamic-based culture, had in the past been ruled by queens.
Within the mainstream Islamic grouping there are also divisions, in particular between the traditionalist and modernist schools. At the same time Indonesia has a sizeable Christian, Hindu and Buddhist minorities. During the early days of independence some Islamic parties wanted to establish an Islamic state, or at the very least to formally recognise the Sharia in the Constitution. This was opposed by non-Muslims and secular-nationalist groups who feared that such an Islamic state would lead to a breakup of Indonesia, particularly as most of the eastern parts of Indonesia are Christians while Bali is a Hindu island.
Today no Islamic parties support the establishment of an Islamic state anymore, and a consensus has been reached that the Preamble to the Constitution which states that Pancasila as the sole ideology of the state will never be amended. Indonesia's national unity can only be guaranteed by a pluralistic and inclusive ideology such as Pancasila so that moves to change the status quo will meet with strong resistance, including from mainstream Islamic organisations. For Islamic parties the emphasis is now more on subtance than form, such as focusing on clean government etc.
Q : The Indonesian Armed Forces were once a powerful and direct decision-makers in politics, but it seems that after 1998, its political role has been progressively down-sized. Is it true?
A : Since 1998 there have been serious efforts undertaken to remove the military from politics and to make the military a professional defence force. Active military members are no longer allowed to occupy political positions or be seconded to the bureaucracy, with the exception to the Department of Defence. Since the recent 2004 legislative elections everty member of DPR (Parliament) and DPD (Regional Council) are elected, thus ending the appointment of unelected members, such as from the military. The military is now above practical politics, though it cannot be denied that its political influence has not totally disappeared.
Q : Before 1998, Indonesia was perceived to be the first among equals in Southeast Asia and it played a leading and anchoring role in preserving Asean coherence and unity of purpose. However, it seems that after 1998, Indonesia has been pre-occupied by domestic issues and problems that it has lost that leadership and anchorship. How true is this observation?
A
: It is true that between 1998 and 2002 Indonesia had little time or energy left to devote to regional cooperation. Indonesia's political instability, myriad social conflicts and ongoing economic crisis kept Indonesia preoccupied internally, and when it looked for assistance Indonesia looked beyond Asean, such as to the IMF, Japan, the EU and the US. It is not surprising that Indonesia is regarded to have lost its pre-eminent position in Asean, though it must be made clear that Indonesia never tried to impose itself as a leader in Asean. In recent years, however, there have been positive developments in Indonesia, such as improved political stability, security and substantial economic recovery. Indonesia has again reiterated its commitment to Asean as the cornerstone of its foreign policy and has in fact come out with a new initiative to develop an Asean Security Community. It is expected that in the coming years Indonesia will again play a more active role in Asean and in other regional and internal forums of which Indonesia is a member.
Q : One of the positive post-reformasi changes as perceived and felt by many outside Indonesia is that the relationship between the Chinese ethnic minority and the rest of the population has improved tremendous. Chinese language and cultural and spiritual expressions have again appeared in the public without being persecuted and discriminated against. Was the anti-Chinese sentiment and riots in the past contrived for strategic, political, partisan or sectarian purposes by certain quarters, rather than mass and spontaneous actions?
A : During the colonial rule the Chinese were given a higher social status than the 'pribumi' by the Dutch. The Chinese were used as tax farmers and middlemen, and they dominated trade. Thus the exploitative colonial policy also led to a direct conflict of interests between the local Chinese and 'pribumi', and anti-colonial movements often targetted Chinese as they were more exposed and vulnerable. During the New Order period the Chinese were both privileged and discriminated against by the government. The military-dominated regime promoted big Chinese family businesses, who provided the slush funds needed by the government elite. While rich and influential Chinese conglomerates were totally dependent upon government patronage so they did not present a threat to the ruling elite. Till the economic crisis the Indonesian economy was dominated by a few large conglomeration owned by cronies of the first family, mostly of ethnic Chinese origin.
At the same time the Chinese were discriminated against socially and politically. Again, the Chinese became targets of anger whenever anti-government protests broke out. After 1998, the Indonesian government has tried to promote 'the people's economy', paying more attention to the small and medium enterprises, and has ended economic monopolies by introducing an anti-trust law. At the same time the discrimination against Chinese and other minorities have been ended by revoking various discriminatory regulations. Indonesia has also ratified the UN Convention against Discrimination. Now Chinese are free to play an active role in politics. Bans on Chinese cultural expressions have also been lifted. The Chinese New Year is now an official public holiday. As the Chinese are no longer seen to be a privileged economic group and as they begin to pay a more active social and political role, relations between ethnic Chinese and 'pribume' have improved considerably.
Part 3 will be published on Monday, July 26
JAMES WONG WING ON is chief analyst of Strategic Analysis Malaysia.


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