The words 'civil society' will come into increasing currency in the next few months, or years, as Anwar Ibrahim seeks to remain an active player in Malaysian politics.

Now that Anwar will be banned from electoral politics until 2008, the option before him is, in the interim, confined to leading the civil society. But what is the nature and future of civil society in Malaysia? Indeed, how much impact would Anwar have on both ?

As a believer in self-empowerment, indeed in pitching one`s individual will against the collective might of the state, which he has successfully done over the last six years, Anwar has never been more convinced that he can do what other intellectuals or leaders before him have failed in Malaysia: To use the available non-political resources to transform the atmospheric state and substance of Malaysian politics.

Anwar in civil society

Although Anwar is no longer the president of the International Islamic University in Malaysia (IIUM), nor a key member of the Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought and Civilisation (ISTAC), remnants of the old networks and institutions, which he once founded in the country remain in place.

The Institute for Policy Studies (IKD), a think tank that bore Anwar's imprints when he was the former deputy prime minister, is his for the taking.

Although IKD is in serious disrepair, given Anwar's international contacts, the think tank could be quickly revived. Indeed, IKD has worked with The Heritage Foundation in the United States before, to focus on the importance of civil society.

Prior to Anwar's arrest in 1998, IKD also organised conferences to mark the achievements of Jose Rizal and Muhammad Iqbal, two of the principal figures in Asia, which in their own life times, had given vent to the importance of political participation.

While these activities would not necessarily enhance the political involvement of the average Malaysian, nor put a dent to the state in any way, IKD could function as an organisational platform for Anwar to assert his status as a Muslim reformist first, since by law, Anwar can neither lead a political party nor a non governmental organisation like Abim for the next four years.

But any exuberant belief in the power of civil society, especially within the context of Malaysia where semblances of soft authoritarianism still prevail, must necessarily caution Anwar from being too confident of his ability to spearhead it; let alone become an instrument to compel the government to be more democratic.

J D Bernal (1901-1971), a British Marxist, once affirmed that 'there are two futures, the future of desire and the future of fate, and man's reason has never learned to separate them.' In the case of Anwar, the danger to believe in his self-importance, has never been more apparent.

This is because while Anwar is a realist, he has been buoyed by his own idealist rhetoric before. Six years of incarceration have also made Anwar more determined than before, to challenge the government, whose levers of influence are all controlled by his former political nemesis.

Nevertheless, such iron-willed indulgences, even momentarily, could lead Anwar to conflate the enthusiasm of civil society for his release with political support for a more liberal Malaysia, when in fact the former is not necessarily linked to the latter at all.

Indeed, attempts to rely on civil society as an instrument of change, are more often than not, a projection purely of one`s ingrained beliefs.

In the case of Anwar, due to his background as a former social reformist, the belief in the usefulness of civil society as the practical outpost with which alternative forms of politics could be meaningfully conducted, is but the logical extension of this value system.

Yet, Malaysian civil society, formed invariably of a wide range of organisations operating outside the government and business sectors, is not necessarily more benign or cohesive. Due to different ideological trajectory and methods of struggle, clashes within elements of civil society are indeed not uncommon.

Observe how some people criticised the leadership of Dr Chandra Muzaffar, president of Just World, when he organised a human rights conference with the attendance of former premier Dr Mahathir Mohamad in 1994.

When Chandra used his good office to call for the release of Anwar in 1998, he too was criticised by members of the NGO community in Malaysia for over-stepping the boundaries of propriety.

In Malaysia, where there is currently a human rights discourse that goes hand-in-hand with an Islamic one, acute ideological conflicts are, again, not unfamiliar.

Civil society uniting

Suaram, Hakam or the Malaysian Bar, for instance, may abjure the further intervention of the state (into individual rights, and space), while a religious order closer to PAS or other Islamic causes, may in turn pursue the reverse to regulate the moral behavior of the individual.

Although civil society is quite capable of broad, invariably shallow, reconciliation at times of crisis, such 'unity' dissipates into thin air as soon as the clear and present danger becomes a distant one.

This is because the clash of fundamental interest and identity naturally result in the absence of the intellectual congruence to create a permanent alliance.

Indeed, it was not until the dismissal of Anwar Ibrahim six years ago, that different groups could envision working together. However, this was helped by their visceral disgust of the Mahathir regime, against the backdrop of the Asian financial crisis.

These circumstances - not necessarily an outward support for reformasi - served to galvanise their animosity into a common front.

More importantly, intense polarisation generated by the riff between Mahathir and Anwar provided an incentive for popular groups to engage in contentious collective action. Once ousted Anwar also sought to lead his own faction.

As Sidney Tarrow, a professor at Harvard University, once explained: Divisions among elites ... encourage portions of the elite that are out of power to seize the role of tribunes of the people.

In Anwar`s bid for support among unincorporated groups, he unleashed a process of mobilisation from below, inspired by the clarion calls for reforms, which eventually proved short-lived due to a harsh clamp down.

What Anwar did succeed in doing, however, was to use his charisma and eloquence to articulate the grievances of the people, thus successfully forging a strong personalistic bond with a thin veneer of the masses that facilitated the mobilisation and collective action.

Invariably, given the multi-ethnic nature of Malaysia, with its cross-cutting cleavages, it is natural that the civil society also manifest the same diversity.

Although, the volume and visibility of civil society has gained considerably over the last 10 years, important questions remain as to its ability to congeal into a unified coalition, or vanguards, that could pose a challenge to the state.

In fact, one must remember that traditionally the Malaysian government is quite adept at co-opting the agenda of the civil society too, thereby marginalising the need for any urgent reforms at all, except of the most piecemeal kind.

Thus, if Anwar should want to transform the nature and future of civil society in Malaysia, along the lines of the Velvet Revolution achieved by Vaclav Havel or the People Power in the Philippines, he must first be able to discipline the civil society in Malaysia to toe his line, not merely to tip its hat at him as a brave political dissident.