For much of the post-World War II period, many West Germans were truly thankful to the United States for the freedom and prosperity that they enjoyed in comparison to their eastern brethren living under communist tutelage.

The physical division of the country may have been traumatic, but it paled into insignificance when one considers the psychological fear of sleeping on the front line of the Cold War.

Was it not JFK who uttered, in his imperfect but passable German, the famous and most appreciated phrase: ich bin ein Berliner (I am a Berliner)?

Still, some, such as Nobel laureate Gnter Grass, would go as far as to argue that the West must come to terms with the existence of two Germanys as atonement for the Nazi atrocities.

When the Berlin Wall finally came down and the Brandenburg Gate was forced open in the autumn of 1989, many were moved to tears at the prospect of reunification if they could secure the blessing and understanding of the US and the former Soviet Union. And they did.

Grass, too, was in tears, only for a very different reason: the most celebrated living German writer feared a revival of extreme nationalism now that Germany was on the course to become a dominant player in European geopolitics. The subsequent peace and stability in the reunited Germany has proved Grass wrong so far.

Public opinion

Fifteen years on, it is perhaps most ironic to know that Washington has turned itself into a victim of its own successful strategic policy on the European Continent, as Germany steadily transformed into a normal country arguably the most visible legacy of Gerhard Schroeder over the last seven years.

Germany's public opinion has grown unfavourable to the US since before the Iraq War of 2003. Cashing on the hostility towards a reckless American administration, Schroeder crossed the Rubicon by taking a clear stance against the war.

The end result? The most serious rupture in an important strategic alliance that had served the two countries well for over five decades.

In the aftermath of the Iraq war, public scepticism in Germany towards the US under President Bush has only hardened. According to the key findings 2005 of Transatlantic Trends , the Germans appear to be deeply uneasy with an America that acts increasingly unilaterally and fickly.

On global affairs, 60 percent of Germans said greater US leadership was "undesirable", compared to 39 percent that answered yes to the question. Interestingly, the numbers in 2002 for the same question were nearly the other way round, with 68 percent of German respondents believing in a US leadership, while only 27 percent considered it undesirable.

As for the performance of the US president in handling international policies, as many as 83 percent of the German respondents did not approve of Bush, which was rather shocking given that the Germans in the 1990s were deeply appreciative of the Clinton administration.

Indeed, the Germans have been consistently critical of Bush's foreign policy following Washington's disastrous response to 9/11. In addition to the Iraq War, US opposition to the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol a vital issue in the highly environmentally conscious Germany are also contributory in generating pervasive anti-Bush sentiments. Short of a substantive change in US strategic outline around the world, it is unlikely that the distrust of Washington will soften any time soon.

It must be stressed here that the changing nature of German-US relations was a by-product of Schroeder's endeavour to make the Berlin Republic a normal country, signifying a clean and total break with the Cold War era during which Germany was beholden to the US in foreign policy.

Renewed hope

Seen in this light, the recent election of Angela Merkel as chancellor was therefore a relief as well as a renewed hope for the Bush administration. A product from the East, Merkel naturally appreciates the role played by the Americans in bringing down the iron curtains in the Eastern Bloc in the late 1980s. As leader of the right-leaning, conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), she is also more likely to find rapport with the Republicans on the other side of the Atlantic.

During the election campaign last September, Merkel pledged to "reinvigorate the transatlantic cooperation with the US", and matched her words by dispatching Wolfgang Schaeuble, a CDU veteran leader, to the White House with a view to assuring the Americans that Germany would be a more reliable European partner for the US.

The Bush administration, too, would return such overtures in no time. In fact, at the top of Washington's wish-list are that Berlin would readjust (read: loosen) its ties with Paris, patch up its differences with London, demonstrate greater interest in and closer engagement with the US-friendly governments in central and eastern Europe and, last but not least, keep Moscow at a healthy distance.

In other words, all would be fine and well should Merkel reverse what Schroeder had done.

But the new chancellor certainly did not expect her challenges in foreign relations to come before her crowning joy dissipated.

For the past week, the newly-formed coalition government between the CDU and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Berlin has been forced on the offensive as to whether German officials under Schroeder's leadership had assisted the abduction and detention of a Lebanese-born German national Khaled el Masri

The Berliner Zeitung quoted in a recent report a German secret service official as saying that the German authorities could have exchanged information with the US government, a clandestine deal that brought el Masri to the attention of the CIA.

There is also serious public concern in Germany over the allegations that, since 2001, the CIA has abducted an estimated 100-150 people using its policy of "extraordinary rendition". Worse are the established investigations that the US Agency secretly flew captives to third-party countries for detention and interrogation. Those destinations include Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, nations consistently rapped by the US State Department for the use of torture.

Now it is the job of Porter Goss, the CIA Director, to refute such claims.

New doubts

Meanwhile, there are allegations that the CIA used the US military airports in Germany to ferry detained suspected terrorists, adding fuel to the already fiery issue and heightening public anger. All this proves difficult for Merkel as she is trying to profile her new cabinet as a fresh and capable team to the international community.

More alarming are the reports that the CIA has made secret use of an airbase in Romania, and runs a Guantanamo Bay-type detention centre in Kosovo, raising the concern among the Germans and Europeans that the Americans could have taken one of their closest strategic partners for a ride .

Given the gravity of the issue, little wonder that even the usually diplomatic and jovial Dutch foreign minister is livid .

The discrepancy between word and deed of the Bush administration will certainly cast new doubts on US long-held commitment to upholding universal human rights and democracy, while creating more hurdles for Merkel to revive Germany's transatlantic relations with the most powerful nation on earth in accordance with her own design.

After all, how normal could a country be if its people are not brave enough to say no, but to live a life of perpetual gratitude to its former benefactor?