President Pervez Musharaff of Pakistan must be a bitter man now.

Since becoming the country's top leader in a military coup seven years ago, he has survived three assassination attempts by extremists. That did not weaken his resolve to be squarely behind America's global war on terror.

Just before President George W Bush landed for a state visit, Pakistan's army launched a three-day offensive in which dozens of pro-Taliban militants were killed in the region of North Warizistan, bordering Afghanistan. Musharaff must have hoped this would strengthen his credentials as a staunch supporter of Bush's war to root out terrorism.

Instead, the US president spent less than 24 hours in Pakistan, much to Musharaff's dismay. Worse, Bush gave no hint of any possible deal with the Pakistanis on the nuclear issue, which was precisely the core element of Bush's visit to India prior to this. With little to report on, it was not at all surprising that a clumsy US president trying his hand at cricket and being hit by a ball ended up the lasting impression of his brief presence there.

Still, the significance of Bush's whirlwind tour to South Asia cannot be understated. India, in particular, is always proud to remind the world of its being the largest democracy. Therefore, when Bush, the first Republican president to touch on New Delhi since Richard Nixon in 1969, publicly announced that the partnership between the two 'free nations' could have the power to transform the world, he was at the same time pronouncing the coming of age of an ancient civilization that had been working profusely to attain modernity.

Compromise

By acknowledging the change in the aloof relationship between the two countries, Bush was unequivocally initiating a major shift and realignment in US foreign policy in regard to the increasingly important region.

In fact, the president was so anxious to cut a deal with his Indian counterpart that he was prepared to recognize India as a de facto nuclear power, on par with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), so long as New Delhi agreed to separate its civilian and military nuclear programmes.

Subject to Congress approval, the US could in future provide India with updated nuclear technology for the latter's energy programmes. That the White House is ready to go to such extent to 'appease' the Indians is no doubt discomforting to the Pakistanis. The visit by Musharaff to Beijing last February was hence interpreted as a reminder that Islamabad does have some powerful friend and options.

To bring India into America's global strategic framework, Bush had no option but to compromise on the delicate issue of nuclear technology, the bad timing in the wake of the western effort to dissuade Iran from pursuing its nuclear goals notwithstanding. The September 11 attacks have so drastically altered US foreign policy that the relations between Washington and its traditional allies such as France and Germany have been characterized by distrust and at times antagonism over the last few years. As the dependability of concrete strategic groupings, Nato especially, is in doubt, the US is increasingly in favour of loose-based alliances in response to global challenges.

Seen in this light, Pakistan's strategic values lie in the country's foundation as a Muslim nation committed to moderation that could counter Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East and Central Asia, although evidence is aplenty in regard to Islamabad's dual role as sponsor and foe of terrorism.

But it is India that fits more into the grander strategy of the US in the foreseeable future. While preoccupied with tackling terrorism on the global scale, Bush has not lost sight of the potential rivalries ahead. As early as in the aftermath of September 11, the White House had identified a host of flashpoints worldwide, for instance an Arab-Israeli war, a confrontation with Taiwan, and a conflict on the Korean peninsula. To pre-empt all these scenarios, specific nuclear planning contingencies were set out under the Nuclear Posture Review 2001, in which Russia, China, North Korea, Iraq (then), Iran and Syria were projected as likely rivals in a nuclear war.

Immediate bearings

In other words, the US, in anticipation of the emergence of China as another superpower, deems it necessary to forge stronger ties with a regional power such as India, which will certainly have a key role to play in some of the conflicts envisaged ahead.

Be so as it may, it remains to be seen if the consensus between the US and India on the nuclear issue will have immediate bearings on regional strategic balance. New Delhi may figure larger than it used to be in the past in US foreign policy, this however will not be done at the expense of Pakistan. What has transpired from Bush's visit to the region is that the US has consolidated its twin-track approach towards the two rivals in South Asia by treating them separately. Put differently, warmer ties with India may not necessarily mean cold shoulder to Pakistan.

Moreover, contrary to what is feared by both Republicans and Democrats in Capitol Hill, Bush's acknowledgement of India as a nuclear power will do nothing detrimental to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The two treaties had failed to guard against the inspiration of other nations for nuclear technology even before India and Pakistan flexed their nuclear muscles in 1998. What Bush has done is nothing more than facing up to the reality that the two mechanisms are long past their sell-by dates, and it is better to put India under some sort of international monitoring from now on.

Finally, it is still not clear at this stage regarding the extent to which the US hopes to initiate change in its strategic outline. What is certain is that US officials will not want to create an uncontrollable monster out of India that could one day pose threat to the sole superpower.

For all his rhetoric about transformation, Bush's ultimate objective is to maintain the status quo as well as America's supremacy by tapping into the strategic advantages of potential allies such as India. An acid test on US commitment to the newly found 'natural partner' is whether Washington would be willing to support New Delhi's bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC, and on what terms.

Which brings me back to a grumpy Musharaff. Despite his misgivings that he has been passed over for a better deal, he should take comfort in the fact that the US president values highly his country as a major 'non-Nato' ally, as long as this suits Bush's grand plan to transform the entire world save America.