Two statements by Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi reported in an English language daily, and posted on an on-line website on (April 14) respectively, have relevance to the 9th Malaysia Plan implementation and therefore need to be commented on.

Titled 'PM tells Little Napoleons to end rebellion' and 'Stipend for village heads', are not only of considerable interest in themselves, but more importantly, are inextricably linked to 9MP implementation strategies.

Therefore, because in both instances the question of political power and authority vested in groups in the decision -making process and in implementation of development projects is involved, questions of accountably in implementation strategies need to be addressed.

Taking the 'Little Napoleons' first. It is somewhat unprecedented that the PM speaking as finance minister should have called upon his officers "not to cause failure in the implementation of development projects either financed by the government or the private sector", or (irrespective of ) whether a state was government or opposition ruled.

Regrettably, such a situation strikes at the heart of the 9MP implementation strategies and is in fact, tantamount to officialdom abusing powers bestowed on them to sabotage plans.

Apart from the fact that the proper recourse such behaviour or threats would normally qualify for charges of insubordination, the more unbelievable significance here is that these officers are prepared to deliberately 'cause failure' to development projects.

This is clearly a very serious situation indeed, where public funds allocated from the taxes paid for by hard working citizens, should fail to be properly utilised simply because of the whims and fancies of these officers.

'Jacks of all trades'

Indeed, the fact that Abdullah thought it fit to remind officers that the federal government also does not discriminate against states ruled by opposition parties suggests that this is yet another area where officialdom can discriminate against opposition states by causing 'failure in implementation of development projects'.

Indeed, it seems clear that such situations have arisen, because of the unhindered bureaucratisation and power distance of the senior ranks of the civil service over the years, and the corresponding weakening of the stringent accountable procedures and processes in government general orders.

There is also a more basic question. These officers belong to the administrative service (formerly known as MCS) which is essentially a colonial legacy whereby the British were able to ensure that colonial policies would be infused into the entire administration.

Therefore these officers, although given wide powers are nothing more than 'jacks of all trades' with no specialisation in any field whatsoever. Therefore they can throw their weight around and overrule the 'professionals' who actually do the jobs.

Moreover, because the rank of officialdom at this level almost exclusively comprises Malays, further limits possibilities for checks and balances because of ethnocentrism and indeed the possible application of the 'Ketuanan Melayu' syndrome.

Deliver votes

The second question of increasing the allowances of village heads in kampongs in the rural areas to 'keep track of development at the grassroots level' appears to be yet another bureaucratic exercise.

In fact, there is already a network of rural development officers at the village level for the purpose of organising Tadika and teaching BM classes ( Kemas) enjoying a generous salary scheme, who seem to be somewhat underemployed in terms of the scope of work and could be utilised (with proper training) to function as villager level development officers.

(However, in this connection it needs to be pointed out that one of their main functions currently is to deliver the kampong votes for Umno during the general elections)

But it is most disappointing to note that the village heads are only supposed to 'keep track of development at grassroots level'. Indeed, it is regrettable that the government either does not have the political will or the right caliber of officers who have the capacity and capability to understand and re-introduce the provisions of the late Abdul Razak's 'Red Book' for this purpose.

The pro-active role and functions of the penghulu/ketua kampong were clearly stipulated in the context of the Jawatan Kuasa Kemajuan Kampong, where rather than 'keep track' of development they were supposed to generate and mobilise the kampong people (especially women and youth) and act as a conduit to decision-makers in the bottom-top approach to development.

With the greatest of respect it appears that what we are now seeing is nothing short of a situation of a 'bankruptcy' of ideas and it is time the government looked to the private sector and indeed qualified and experienced professional whether local or expatriate to help 'man the shop' and deliver.

DR COLLIN ABRAHAM holds a doctorate degree in race relations from Oxford. He was initially a civil servant attached to the Welfare Ministry as well as undertook research projects with the Ministry of Rural Development and Economic Planning Unit. He was subsequently seconded to Universiti Sains Malaysia where he was associate professor in sociology, and more recently visiting fellow. He is currently pro-tem president, Malaysian Association of Social Impact Assessors.