Of all the characters that have passed through the corridors of power in Malaysia, Tan Sri CC Too (Too Chee Chew) must have been one of the most colourful (and difficult to deal with).

Born on 31 March 1920 in Kuala Lumpur, Too's family were originally from Hainan province, South China and his father Too Choo Sun was a staunch nationalist who supported the nationalist movement back in the mainland. Too's grandfather, Too Nam, was also a close associate of the Chinese nationalist leader Dr Sun Yat Sen.

His early education at Victoria Institution and Raffles College (in Singapore) soon brought him into the orbit of Communists and Union workers based in Malaya (as it was called then). Too's early days saw him skirting dangerously close to the leaders of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU). (1)

After the Second World War however, Too's attitude towards his erstwhile 'comrades' changed radically as he began to work with the Chinese Nationalists who were based in Kuala Lumpur, and then with the intelligence agencies set up by the British colonial administration. He joined the Emergency Information Service (EIS) in February 1951 and was given the task of producing anti-Communist propaganda for the British colonial authorities.(2)

When General Sir Gerald Templer set up the Psychological Warfare Interrogation Centre (PWIC) in March 1953 (3), Too transferred his activities there as well. When Malaya gained its independence in 1957, Too was awarded the Johan Mangku Negara (Defender of the Realm) award by Tunku Abdul Rahman himself. Too was then given the task of heading the Psychological Warfare Section of the government of the Malayan Federation - a post he held for 27 years until he finally retired in January 1983.

During this time he made numerous visits to other countries that were facing the problem of an imminent Communist take-over, like Laos and Vietnam (in 1960). He also worked with numerous intelligence services from Britain, America and Singapore and played an active part in neutralising the Communist forces active in Singapore in the early 1960s. (Something the Singaporean government never credited him for.)

'Psychic powers', exorcist

A difficult character to work with, Too was forever secretive about his work and his private life. He remained a bachelor till his dying day, and was reluctant to pass on details about his personal history and his activities in the secret services. Some work has already been done on the life and times of Too (4), but the latest book by Lim Cheng Leng sheds new light on the man who was destined to become the biggest obstacle to the advance of the MCP in Malaya/Malaysia.

The author in question is perhaps the best man for the job at hand. Having been a member of the Malaysian Intelligence Services and Special Branch himself, Lim Cheng Leng had the opportunity to work closely with Too over several decades.

His own role in Sarawak (where he led the campaign against the Pasokan Rakyat Kalimantan Utara (Paraku) and North Kalimantan Communist Party (NKCP) prior to the establishment of the Rejang Security Command (Rascom) means that Leng has the added advantage of writing as an 'insider' in the psy-war and counter-insurgency business.

His narrative reads as a compelling account of the history of the man who was working behind the scenes to bring about the defeat of the MCP and its militia wing the MNLA (Malayan National Liberation Army). For one, we learn of the quirks and mannerisms of the head of Malaysian Intelligence whom most of us had never seen.

For the man who rose to become the head of Malaysian Intelligence was known for some of his more peculiar features. Leng notes that during his time Too was also credited with having 'psychic powers' and that he could perform exorcism ceremonies from time to time (pp. 89-90) - something that may have come in handy in the murky world of espionage and psychological warfare.

Setting aside the eccentric features of Too's (admittedly complex) character, we also learn a lot about the internal workings of the secret services and the mindset of the intelligence operatives themselves. What is even more interesting is the zero-sum logic that was at work in the calculations of the security forces as they dealt with what they regarded as the most significant threat to Malaysian security and sovereignty at the time.

(Too for one was adamant that the MCP should be crushed at all costs and that no compromises with the Communists should be made. He was against the formal recognition of the MCP during the Baling talks in 1955 and was dead set against offering the leaders of the MCP an amnesty in 1989.)

Sophisticated, well-run Special Branch

Another interesting aspect of the work is that it shows just how far and wide the net was cast during the conflict with the MCP during the first (1948-1960) and second (1968-1978) Emergencies. Malaysian intelligence and security forces were working closely with both Western and regional (particularly Singaporean) intelligence services in their efforts to neutralise the MCP and their supporters.

One of the more interesting episodes in the text comes when Leng discusses the MCP's connection with the Baling student demonstrations in 1974 (which led to the massive student demos in Kuala Lumpur and the arrest of a number of university students leaders like a certain Anwar Ibrahim) (Leng, pp. 182-184).(5)

Of related interest are Leng's claims that the MCP played a role in the formation of numerous anti-colonial and anti-governmental movements and political parties like the Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM or MNP) which was led by Mokhtaruddin Lasso and later Dr Burhanuddin al-Helmy (who later became the third President of PAS in 1956).

In 1965, another move was made by the MCP when it tried to promote a radical Islamist party by the name of Partai Persaudaraan Islam (Paperi) whose leaders claimed that the Umno-led government was fundamentally 'un-Islamic' and that there was no radical difference between Communism and Islam's call for justice.

Basing their claims on certain interpretations of the Qur'an and Hadith, the leaders of this small Islamist-leftist party tried to argue that their struggle against the government was part of a 'holy war' against the enemies of the ummah . Similar efforts were made in later years when the MCP tried to form the Partai Kebangsaan Revolusi Malaya (PKRM) in 1981, another effort that came to naught.

In practically every one of its major political campaigns and military offensives, the MCP and its ancillary units were defeated thanks to the wily CC Too and the backroom boys in the Special Branch. Though the SB may not be flavour of the month during present times, seen from the point of view of a political scientist and student of political institutions the record of the SB and Malaysian intelligence services from the 1950s to the late 1990s shows that they were among the most sophisticated and well-run appendages to the state's political and governmental apparatus.

Asians 'fundamentally docile'

But one thing that is missing from the narrative of Leng is the view from the other side, which may have seen (and still does) the Special Branch from a different angle. Little is said about the impact that these campaigns had on the Malaysian public and the general public's perception of the state and of Malaysian politics at large.

Too himself was known to be a man of decidedly authoritarian tendencies and sympathies - something which comes out painfully and embarrassingly clear in his speech to American intelligence officers which is included in the appendix. Referring to Asians as a 'fundamentally docile' people who need to be led and governed from above, Too saw the Malaysian population through the lens of a securocrat and technocrat who believed in (what today is regarded as outdated) Fordist terms. Society had to be policed for its own good and for its own safety, as his argument went.

However, Malaysian society has also changed radically over the past few decades and the combined effects of rapid development, social dislocation, globalisation and exposure to uncontrollable external variables means that we now live in a society that is far more complex and confounding than the monochromatic moral universe of the likes of Too.

As the Malaysian state struggles to win back lost ground thanks to its own crisis of credibility and popularity, new factors such as religion, religio-political discourse, geo-politics and external relations come into play. Just how a man like Too would have dealt with these developments is anyone's guess, and to his credit Leng does not put words into the man's mouth.

But one thing is for sure: Lim Cheng Leng's work on the life and times of Too is required reading for anyone interested in understanding the fundamentals of government and the logic of state security operatives in Malaysia.

More than any other work of its kind, Leng's book gives us a rare glimpse of the internal workings of the Malaysian secret service and intelligence agencies who, after all, also belong to that Other Malaysia that we seldom talk about.

The Story of a Psy-Warrior: The Biography of Tan Sri Dr.CC Too

Author: Lim Cheng Leng

Published by Lim Cheng Leng

Printed by Interpress Printers Sdn. Bhd. Taman Gombak Tambahan, Batu Caves

Kuala Lumpur, 2000. 262 pages. Price: RM69 (hardcover).

Endnotes:

(1) During his early childhood Too was sent to Chinese vernacular schools in Kuala Lumpur. But his family decided to allow him to complete his education in the British colonial educational stream and Too was sent to Victoria Institution (VI) and later Raffles College in Singapore. During his schooldays Too proved to be an exceptionally gifted student and he was attracted to the activities of the communist movement in Malaya.

Ramakrishna (2000) claims that Too was secretly involved in the activities of the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU) during the early 1940s and that he even met with the leader of the MCP, Chin Peng, personally (pg. 73). But by the end of the Second World War Too was no longer persuaded by the Communist's ideological struggle and worked as he Secretary of the Nationalist Chinese Consulate based in Kuala Lumpur in 1946. (Leng, 2000, pg. 74).

[For a fuller account of the life and work of Too, see: Lim Cheng Leng, The Story of a Psy-Warrior: Tan Sri Dr. CC Too , Interpress Printers, Batu Caves, Selangor. 2000. and Kumar Ramakrishna, The Making of a Malayan Propagandist: The Communists, the British and Too in the Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (JMRAS), Vol. LXXIII, Part 1. June 2000. pp. 67-90.]

(2) The Emergency Information Service (EIS) was set up in March 1951 and its first head was Hugh Carleton Greene. The EIS was then based at Bluff Road, Kuala Lumpur, and its main aim was to provide anti-Communist propaganda that would be distributed by the radio and mainstream media services in the country.

The colonial authorities felt at the time that the Malayan Radio and Film Unit was not doing enough in the effort to contain the spread of MCP activities and influence among the public, and that there was a need for a more subtle approach to the conflict that employed the use of psychological warfare. Greene laid down the basic rules of psychological warfare and propaganda in Malaya, which were then learnt and practiced by his disciple and co-worker, Too.

Greene argued that for the anti-Communist propaganda to be effective it needed to be factual, relevant and not provocative. Rather than attack the Communists outright, Greene preferred to win them over with promises of safe conduct and fair treatment.

Ramakrishna notes that: 'The EIS had three main objectives - to raise public confidence in the government and increase the flow of information from the public to the Police; to attack the morale of the members of the MRLA and Min Yuen; and to drive a wedge between the leaders and followers of the MCP so as to encourage defection among them.' (See Ramakrishna, 2000. pp. 76-77).

During his time at the EIS, Too managed to re-direct the approach of the authorities towards a more persuasive and conciliatory mode. He argued that the use of threats and violence would not lead to the demoralisation of the MCP or the surrender of its members.

(3) The Psychological Warfare Interrogation Centre (PWIC) was set up by General Templer on March 18, 1953 and it was first based at the Central Police Headquarters in Kuala Lumpur. The head of the PWIC was ADC Peterson, who was appointed Director-General of Information Services and personally chosen by Templer himself.

Peterson's task was to conduct studies into how and why the Chinese were supporting the Communists in Malaya and to identify ways and means to stop this flow of support to the MCP. Peterson managed to streamline the activities of the various information and counter-insurgency operations in the country, and eventually centralised all of these activities under the PWIC.

But Peterson was also known to harbour the belief that such work should be carried out by Western intelligence officers and that local operatives should play only a supporting role in the task. This led to a clash between him and the Malayan Chinese propaganda expert, Too, who eventually resigned in protest. (Too was subsequently re-employed in 1955 and he remained active until 1983). (See Ramakrishna, 2000. pp. 79-80).

(4) See, for example, Kumar Ramakrishna, The Making of a Malayan Propagandist: The Communists, the British and Too . In Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (JMRAS), Vol. LXXIII, Part 1. June 2000. pp. 67-90.

(5) Leng notes that prior to the student demonstrations in Kuala Lumpur, the then illegal Communist radio station Suara Revolusi Malaya issued a report claiming that peasants were dying of hunger in the Baling region in Kedah. According to him, this was one of the factors that mobilised the student leaders and got them out in the streets in 1974.