The allegations of infiltration of triads into MCA due to widespread money politics are not at all surprising.

Money politics is an indication of the feudal political culture and is endemic not just within MCA but also other component parties of the Barisan Nasional. I suspect it is less alleged of our opposition parties o­nly because they are not yet in the position of power to dispense political patronage and largesse in exchange for political contributions and campaign moneys.

The bottom line is that, but for an exceptional few, most politicians enter into politics in this country in the interest primarily of personal advancement rather than in the interest of a public cause or the interest of the rakyat. This selfish attitude is not confined to aspirants of political positions but also their supporters, voters and constituencies, and to this extent, it is a sad indictment o­n the collective Malaysian political maturity.

The cost of 'buying votes' and to climb up the party hierarchy would include expenses incurred for hosting dinners, giving gifts if not outright ang pows, financing trips and dispensing study loans for members' children.

BN is now publicly against 'money politics', which it narrowly defines as money directly spent indiscriminately in party elections to be elected to party office. This would necessarily exclude much of the other kinds of favours.

The fact is that money politics is, and has always been, an intrinsic factor in Malaysian politics. Had politicians closed ranks, remained united and refrained from 'blowing the whistle' o­n that which is rampant, and tacitly accepted as norm, nobody would be the wiser, and the pretence of amanah, cekap dan bersih need not be subject to so much strain as to warrant their present public stance against money politics, starting with the declaration of personal assets.

But no, they were not united - in the case of Umno, Anwar Ibrahim thought it fit, after 18 years within the administration, to allege cronyism and got slapped back with a list that included similar accusations against him, and the issue was narrowed down to who had more cronies! (It is not, and has never been wrong - this awarding of political largesse and patronage due to perks of office.)

What aggravates matters is when someone stays too long in office and monopolises the powers of patronage so that others do not have the chance to help their own cronies and build up the requisite network of political support from the spoils that high office confers).

Even today MCA need not have to wash dirty linens in public if it were not due to disunity and power struggle between Teams A and B.

But are politicians to be solely blamed and raykat absolved from the blemish of money politics?

Let's be very candid here: if money is not, for majority of members of political parties, the prime criterion for selecting their leaders, what else is?

A politician's aim to secure a position within the administration by which he can grant exclusive and lucrative contracts and licenses to corporations and businessmen who will in turn make political financial contributions to the politician as part of the cost of business.

As contributors have to be discreet to maintain the facade of amanah, bersih, cekap the liaisons are best formed with business associates that o­ne knows best and reasonably well. From here arises the phenomenon of cronyism.

The idea here is to use the funds contributed in part for the political party campaign, in part to channel it up to o­ne's immediate political boss and in part to line up o­ne's own pocket. o­ne seldom gets prosecuted for the last appropriation as long as he is kept within the good graces of higher-ups because any attempt to prosecute for personal corruption will inevitably implicate both the political bosses as well as o­ne's own political party.

Money politics then is the way by which political funds are raised by dispensation of political patronage in awarding contracts and licenses and other business favours and how the national resources of the country are in this way appropriated for the maintenance of the political power of the ruling elite and ruling parties.

It is a phenomenon that is entirely consistent with our feudal political culture of giving blind support to our leaders and elders irrespective of right or wrong in exchange for their protection and favours.

Against the backdrop of the above architecture of money politics, how triads could infiltrate a political party like MCA is probably due to the following symbiotic synergies.

First, it is must be recognised that triads are involved in lucrative but illegal activities such as drug trafficking, prostitution, vending of pirated softwares, smuggling not o­nly of contraband goods but illegal immigrants.

Second, the ill-gotten gains generally need to be laundered before being used to purchase houses and cars and to finance children's education of o­ne's immediate family or that of o­ne's mistresses. (This is necessary because these legitimate activities involve the reflection in tax returns or have records in various government agencies).

The black money can be laundered through sprees in casinos or the buying of businesses like restaurants or karaoke pubs. These may not actually make profit, yet their financial statements always show a taxable profit arising from injection of the illegal moneys. Instead of being 'washed' through these normal channels, the other way is to use them to make political contributions to politicians and political parties.

There are several advantages to this.

Political contributions are tax-free: no o­ne will probe from where they were derived.

Politicians, when so gratified by these contributors of political funds to finance their political campaign will return the favour by granting, when they are in positions of authority to do so, licences and contracts which provide avenues for further making of profits and also legitimate vehicles through which ill-gotten gains may be continuously laundered.

In addition, the political parties and politicians will also be in a position to recommend 'datukship' or other titles to their benefactors.

The respectability from these titles and promise of political patronage are required to thwart investigations and raids of illegal activities by enforcement authorities that, by and large, are controlled by their political bosses.

All in all, it is a very mutually beneficial relationship. Sometimes it does not turn out that smooth due to loss of benefactor's patronage or the benefactors' outlandish actions - we hear of some 'datuks' being prosecuted for shooting people or being shot at or committing criminal breach of trust or charged for share manipulation.

In the case of MCA, it is even easier because of traditional and cultural links between secret societies, triads and Chinese political leadership.

Ritual brotherhood and secret societies have prevailed in Chinese tradition since the time of Qing Dynasty, and popularised in well known tales of the 'Romance of the Three Kingdoms'.

Chinese immigrants in the 19th and earlier part of 20th centuries brought with them their secret societies. The British colonial administrators used the Ghee Hin and the Hai San to recruit migrants, maintain law and order between them in the tin mines of Perak and generally, to act as intermediaries.

Whilst many secret societies indulging in flagrant criminal activities like extortion and killings have been eliminated in the last three decades by our efficient police armed with draconian laws (Restricted Residence Act, Essential Regulations, ISA and the like), those that survive nowadays, do so under the guise of business entrepreneurs of businesses both legal and illegal with the assistance of political links and patronage.

No longer do they engage in overt and well publicised killings, extortions and street fights that fuel public outrage and demand for police action. They now make lots of money, buy political patronage and co-operation and connive with various peoples in other sectors to avert too rigorous an investigation.