The tendency to lump together various Islamist groups in Southeast Asia has made it crucial to distinguish between what are actually very different organisations.

The groups fall into several different categories: Islamist revivalist movements that focus on cultural and spiritual renewal, political parties, armed and unarmed organisations fighting for autonomy or secession for Muslim areas, radical Islamic paramilitary groups, and transnational terrorist cells and networks.

But the differences between them have been obscured by Mr George Bush's rhetoric, which emphasised that countries are 'either with us or against us' in the war against terror. Such a simplistic paradigm ignores the fact that many Islamic organisations oppose Al-Qaeda, and yet also disapprove of the US campaign in Afghanistan and the Middle East.

The majority of Islamic groups in Southeast Asia are in fact non-violent. The largest and most influential are either political parties or revivalist organisations. One such group is the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia and the world, with 30 million followers.

The NU espouses traditional Muslim values, but 'traditional' in this context means a fairly tolerant and pluralistic approach to Islam. Indeed, the NU recently agreed to help combat extremism

of some Islamist groups and has supported efforts to crack down on the violence. It is also important to stress that the popularity of even moderate Islamic groups should not be overstated.

Only a quarter of the parties that contested the 1999 election advocated the creation of an Islamic state. These parties received 16 per cent of the vote, whereas secular parties received 60 per cent and moderate Islamic parties received 20 per cent.

None of this is meant to deny that violent terrorist groups exist in Southeast Asia. Jemaah Islamiah (JI) advocates the creation through force of an Islamic state from southern Thailand through the lower part of the Phillippines. They count among the ranks businessman such as Yazid Sufaat, who in October 2000 hosted two of the Sept 11 hijackers and Zacarias Moussaoui.

In addition, SE Asia is also home to various militant organisations for which Islam is an important element of their identity, but only as it relates to demands for autonomy or secession, not as an end in itself. This includes, the Moro National Liberation Front, Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Free Aceh Movement.

The final category to consider is radical Islamist paramilitary groups that blur the edges between criminal gangs and militias. This type includes Abu Sayyaf and Laskar Jihad, that mix politics with criminal activities such as extortion and racketeering.

What should be kept in mind about all these organisations is that they are all symptoms of the same diseases: problems in the local economy, the weakness of states in the region, and the fragility of democratic institutions and regional intergovernmental organisations.

Poverty alone cannot explain the existence of transnational terrorist networks such as Jemaah Islamiyah. However, poverty and inequality have contributed to popular discontent and helped groups such as Laskar Jihad and Abu Sayyaf.

Mr Bush should support economic policies that promote broad-based growth, even if these policies diverge from the wholesale liberalisation typically advocated in Washington. Finally, the US should commit to regional efforts to improve economic, political, and social conditions. Successive US administrations have offered little support for regional initiatives under the auspices of Asean.

Such a partnership should focus not just on countering existing terrorist networks but also on strengthening regional coordination to attack the roots of violent Islamism.