analysis

The colourful but violent photographs on the front pages of all newspapers, freeze-framing chairs in mid-air, faces full of hatred and discontent, fingers pointed at each other and fistfights at the MCA Youth annual general meeting last Friday, speak volumes of the general disorder of a component of the ruling party of Malaysia.

As the prime minister and chairperson of the ruling National Front, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, as expected, gave advice on the need to preserve unity and stability in MCA. It is his job as the paramount leader of the coalition.

However, many would question how legitimate and morally qualified Mahathir is to preach unity and stability to MCA, currently torn between its president Dr Ling Liong Sik and his deputy Lim Ah Lek.

It is indeed difficult to blame the cynics for questioning the moral standing and legitimacy of his advice on party unity and stability. Rightly or wrongly, most of the cynics would point to the 'fact' that it is because of Mahathir that Umno has been experiencing one political crisis after another.

In 1987, only five years after Mahathir came into power in Umno and the top office of the government, the Malay-based party was split into two great rival factions between Mahathir himself and Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah; and then 10 years later, Mahathir got into really serious troubles with his former protege and deputy Anwar Ibrahim.

For the older generation of Malaysians, they still remember how the younger Mahathir confronted the late Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj over all kinds of issues, and how Mahathir was sacked from Umno in the aftermath of the 1969 general elections.

'Non-interference' option

In fact, there is a powerful thought in MCA and pro-MCA circles in the Chinese-language media that it is the troubles in Umno that have destabilised the National Front and jeopardised its overall image and standing. It is Umno that has caused problems and troubles for MCA, not the other way round.

So, the advice given by Mahathir on MCA unity and stability reminds people of a very insightful Malay proverb: Bagai ketam mengajar anak berjalan betul (like a crab teaching its young to crawl straight). As an experienced politician, Mahathir should know better than anyone else that any leader, including he himself, when perceived as " cakap tak serupa bikin " or "not practising what he preaches" is a powerful stimulus for popular contempt, resistance and rejection, albeit in secret when the leader still appears to be strong, powerful, invincible and indispensable.

Certainly, all partisans in the great MCA power struggle now have to openly praise and quote the wisdom of Mahathir as a matter of normal courtesy and as a practical means to a practical end, but how many of them really listen to his advice in the hearts of their hearts, is another matter. After all, it is the political life and death of the members of both factions themselves, not Mahathir's, that are at stake in the battle royale in MCA.

In this respect, if Mahathir does not manage things wisely, he could be held in secret contempt by the contending leaders of both factions of MCA and their supporters on the ground, and lose their support. In principle, Mahathir should just keep quiet and let them fight it out among themselves, and then accept whichever faction that wins the party elections. It is a safe and soft option advocated by, for example, his deputy party president and deputy premier, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, a few days ago.

'Right to advice'

Of course, that option of 'non-interference' might not be agreeable to some in Umno or even Gerakan and other component parties of the National Front.

MCA, as the second largest party in the ruling coalition, like it or not, is strategically too important to be ignored or left alone. Even those in other component parties of the National Front who hate or at least dislike MCA - like Gerakan and its president, Lim Keng Yaik - would readily concede that an unstable and turbulent MCA would be contagious, and affect the overall image of the coalition.

It is upon this premise that Gerakan and Keng Yaik as well as Umno deputy president Abdulah claimed the right to 'advice' the Ling's faction not to proceed, or be too hasty, to take over the Chinese dailies Nanyang Siang Pau and

China Press . In fact, based upon the same premises, MIC could also claim the same right to 'advice'.

There is also a third option that is more radical but not unprecedented. That is for Umno, Gerakan, MIC and other more peaceful component parties of the National Front to carry out some kind of 'humanitarian intervention' by temporarily taking over the management of MCA from now on until the party elections next year with the objective of stabilising and re-conciliating the warring factions until a new leadership comes into power under certain rules set up by a third party.

In international relations, it is like the case of UN's multilateral peace-keeping forces entering Somalia, Rwanda or East Timor and restoring order. Umno did that once to MCA in the 1980s when it appointed Tun Ghafar Baba to run a turbulent MCA for a few months.

Ling or Lim?

Like it or not, the inner circle of Umno, its strategists and propagandists have also to take up some position or attitude, albeit secretly and subtly, on the factions in MCA. Which faction Umno should favour? Ling's or Lim's?

Intuitively, Umno or Umno strategists would probably argue the case for Lim because he and his faction are weaker or less powerful, and need 'external support' from Umno, and Umno needs it to countervail the relatively powerful and assertive faction of Ling who has not only taken over two influential Chinese-language newspapers besides having the control of a popular English daily, but also somehow obtained licence to set up a private university.

Umno cannot afford to have a too-strong or relatively powerful MCA in the post-Mahathir Malaysia because there is still no sign of Umno regaining its relative strength vis-a-vis MCA and other components of the National Front. A strong MCA might save Mahathir in the 2004 general elections but it would certainly be a potential threat to Mahathir's weaker successors in the post-Mahathir epoch.

This option would certainly gain support not only from Lim's faction but also, among others, Gerakan and Keng Yaik who was himself sacked from MCA in the 1970s, and whose party is now in direct competition with MCA for Chinese support and resources, particularly over allocation of seats, the post of the chief ministership in Penang, and the control of the Penang Chinese Chamber of Commerce which is still under the MCA in the person of one Tan Kok Peng.

On the surface, this option seems to be perfect but a second thought suggests otherwise. If the Lim faction becomes stronger and more powerful than Ling's, it might indirectly cause problems for the establishments in Umno, Gerakan and other component parties of the National Front. For months, the dissidents in MCA, in their fights against Ling's faction, have churned out many seemingly liberal and democratic ideas that might be contagiously subversive.

For example, the open and very articulate criticism from MCA Youth chief Ong Tee Keat against Ling's "one-man rule", "despotism", "cronyism" and "eunuch politics", etc. might boomerang and hit back at Mahathir, Keng Yaik and MIC president S Samy Vellu who share the interests and mission with Ling of maintaining the established order and values in their respective parties. Youth rebellion as promoted by Ong is certainly menacing to all the old guard who have overstayed their tenure in the political establishment and the mainstream media.

Also, the proposal of Lim's faction for the tenure of top leaders of the party be limited to three terms or nine years, which have been passed by the Pahang MCA and passionately debated elsewhere, is also contagiously 'subversive' to the political establishments in not only in MCA, but also Umno, Gerakan, MIC and SUPP. If the faction becomes stronger and even victorious with the blessing and backing of Umno, the 'dangerous' and contagiously 'subversive' ideas might spread to other component parties of the National Front.

If this assessment is adopted, then it is to the strategic interests of the old guard, men and women, in MCA, Umno, Gerakan, MIC and SUPP to form a 'Holy Alliance' to contain and suppress these 'dangerous' and contagiously 'subversive' ideas, as well as to ensure the defeat of Lim's faction, particularly Youth chief Ong.

A weakened Umno

The above analyses only apply on the assumption that Umno is a powerful monolith and still in a position to manipulate MCA and other components of the National Front.

But what if Umno is further weakened and even defeated in the Malay/Muslim hinterland whose mood and sentiment is beyond the control of MCA, MIC, Gerakan, SUPP and even DAP?

Would MCA, MIC and Gerakan leaders in the Malay/Muslim hinterland be that 'idealistic' to swim or sink with an Umno in opposition?

This then opens up another dimension of Malaysian politics: just as Umno has contingent strategies with regard to MCA, Gerakan and MIC, the latter three and their different factions too have their own contingent strategies with regard to Umno. But to explore that is not the purpose of this article. Watch this space for more.

JAMES WONG WING ON is the chief analyst of [#1] Strategic Analysis Malaysia [/#]. He is a former Member of Parliament (1990-1995) and a former columnist for the Sin Chew Jit Poh Chinese daily. He read political science and economics at the Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. While in Sin Chew , he and a team of journalists won the top awards of Malaysian Press Institute (MPI) for 1998 and 1999.