(IPS) analysis

More than any other region, South Asia faces the gravest implications of the United States' anti-terrorism strategy crafted in the aftermath of the Sept 11 carnage in New York and Washington.

An important subtext of these cataclysmic events has been the jockeying for position by rivals Pakistan and India to play a role in the US coalition against terrorism.

Since the attacks, the American worldview has undergone a radical transformation. With it is gone the premise of the Bush administration's initial South Asian policy that was being propped by three pillars: promoting India as a counterweight to China because of the perception of China as the new adversary that ought to be contained, and pushing Pakistan into a corner as a virtual pariah.

As recently as Sept 3, writing in the ' International Herald Tribune , the journalist Nayan Chanda in his 'Seeing China Grow, Washington Warms to India' stated ''the common concern of the United States and India about China's rising power and its attempts to extend its power in Asia remains the unspoken basis for strategic cooperation''.

After Sept 11, this is no longer the case.

Pakistan, which showed remarkable alacrity in joining the new anti-terrorist coalition being cobbled together by the United States, jumped the queue of potential allies since India was ahead in offering bases to Washington for its bombers in the operation to get the Saudi fugitive Osama bin Laden, who has been named by the United States as the prime suspect in last week's attacks.

Ironically, India was not even asked while Pakistan was first cajoled, and upon complying, was eagerly embraced as the key component of the anti-terrorism campaign.

While neither side has publicly specified any quid pro quo in the new arrangement between Pakistan and the United States, American media has reported that Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf had asked Bush to give debt relief, lift sanctions and take a positive US role on Kashmir.

Others quoted administration officials as saying that Musharraf's representations were 'reasonable', and yet others pointed out that these demands are minor compared to what the United States is expecting in return for Pakistani cooperation.

Critical concerns

In his address to the Pakistani people on Sept 19, General Musharraf's first speech after Sept 11, he justified Pakistan's decision as preserving, promoting and protecting what he stated were four 'critical concerns' of the country: Pakistan's security and strength, economy, strategic assets (nuclear and missile programmes) and the Kashmir cause.

He also accused India of wanting ''to isolate us, move closer to the United States and get us declared a terrorist state'' - goals that Pakistan feels have now been foiled due to the changed nature of Pakistan's role in the American-led anti-terrorist coalition.

India's failure on this count stems from erroneous assumptions that were based on two cardinal beliefs of South Block, more so in the wake of warming of relations between the Bush administration and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government.

Given last year's establishment of a Joint Working Group on Terrorism with the United States and India's cooperation on this issue with various countries ranging from Russia to Israel, South Block assumed a 'natural' role for India if American anti-terrorism strategy was to centre on South Asia.

Hence, Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh's immediate offering of bases to the United States, even prior to any official American request.

The other assumption that went awry was the fact that India thought Pakistan would not be able to distance itself from the Taliban or join an American-led coalition, because of domestic political exigencies particularly the ' jihadi ' factor.

In these fast-paced developments, Pakistan was faced with a difficult decision.

Strategic choice

It faced a strategic choice between risking retaliation from the United States if it remained closeted with the Taliban regime or sacrificing 'strategic depth' on its western flanks by preserving its position on Kashmir, since Washington has refused to endorse the long-standing Indian refrain of slotting Pakistan's Kashmir policy with the ''terrorism of the Taliban and Osama''.

Given this context, it is not surprising that there has been muted criticism from within the BJP government regarding the rush to pronouncements from New Delhi that were not in sync with policies emanating from Washington.

The ' Indian Express ' newspaper reported that after an informal Cabinet meeting in New Delhi on Sept 19, at least four key ministers had criticised how ''India had jumped the gun by offering military help and logistical assistance to the United States without knowing Washington's game plan''.

Even India's efforts to be a factor on Afghanistan remain sidelined. In a media interview on Sept 19, Indian Ambassador to the United States Lalit Mansingh said that ''India has an interest in Afghanistan due to historic and cultural relations''.

Recently, Dushanbe, Tajikistan's capital, convened a meeting on Afghanistan, attended by Russia, India, Iran, Uzbekistan and the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, whose kingpin, Commander Ahmad Shah Masoud, was killed just two days before the terror attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon.

While the Dushanbe meeting was basically an endeavour for a non-Taliban and non-Pakistani approach to Afghanistan, the U.S. anti-terrorism strategy is by necessity dependent on incorporating Pakistan and other Muslim countries.

It is designed so that any possible strike on Afghanistan does not degenerate into a self-fulfilling 'clash of civilisations' prophecy, and US actions do not spawn a new confrontation between the Muslim world and the United States.

Islam, not India, is the key to the current crisis - hence, Pakistan's role has assumed crucial importance for Washington's policymakers.