Second Afghanistan war to change political landscape
(IPS) analysis
Although they were expected, the US-led military strikes on Afghanistan will add to the suffering of the Afghan nation that, in the last two decades, has faced occupation by the Soviet Red Army, an internecine civil war, and now, the US attacks.After patiently cobbling a 'coalition against terrorism', the US went ahead with its military operation Sunday night-without waiting for the emergency meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) foreign ministers set for Oct 10 in Qatar.
Washington did not make evidence about Osama bin Laden public before the people, sharing it only with Muslim regimes, and apparently declined to pursue the 'campaign against terrorism' under the United Nations (UN) auspices.
Probably, the experience of the UN General Assembly special session on terrorism that ended on Oct 5, which saw a record 167 of 189 members participating, deterred the US from this option because the UN failed to agree on a definition of terrorism.
Many UN members view 'state terrorism' as equally abominable as terrorism by individuals and differentiate legitimate struggles for self-determination from terrorism.
The New York Times , in a story on Oct 7 indicated that following the results of US Defence Secretary Rumsfeld's tour of Muslim nations last week, "The United States intended to make it (the anti-terrorism campaign) as much as possible an all-American campaign.''
Key Muslim coalition partners namely Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Oman and Uzbekistan also did not allow their territory or troops to be used in military action against Afghanistan, limiting their participation to the support of operations rather than offensive strikes.
Basically, the US, helped by Britain and other Western allies, has chosen to respond to what some reports claim is 82 percent of American public opinion that was egging on the Bush administration to retaliate against the carnage of Sept 11.
Changing regime
What are the implications of the Sunday bombings on Afghanistan, Pakistan and the region as a whole?
For Afghanistan, a change of regime is on the cards, a policy to which Pakistan has clearly acquiesced.
The revival of the 'Zahir Shah (exiled Afghan King) option', coupled with the Northern Alliance acting a virtual junior partner of the American forces, is a pointer to the emerging scenario.
Pakistan President Gen Pervez Musharraf told the press in Islamabad on Monday morning that ''I have been assured by everyone, 110 percent, that they will keep our concerns in mind'', referring to Pakistan's reservations about the Northern Alliance benefitting from this conflict.
But as the situation evolves there is little doubt that not withstanding these reservations, the US will reach out to the Taliban's implacable foes, the Northern Alliance, as it tries to fashion a future regime in Afghanistan.
In a 1985 media interview in Rome, his first with a Pakistani journalist since his ouster in a 1973 coup, Zahir Shah came across as a person who was not hostile to Pakistan, referring to his track record during the 1965 and 1971 wars between India and Pakistan. During that time, Afghanistan was neutral and did not take any action supportive of India against Pakistan.
Any future regime in Kabul, irrespective of its political colour, could not afford to be hostile to Pakistan given its own serious internal crises and the dictates of geography.
For Pakistan, Sunday's military strikes signal the end of Pakistan's Afghan policy that was premised on a close relationship with the Taliban.
Shared intelligence
At his press conference on Oct 8, Gen Musharraf admitted that Pakistan had shared intelligence with the US and allowed its planes to fly over Pakistani territory, although they did not operate from there. He confirmed Monday that Pakistan had given permission for the use of its airspace in US military action.
There may be some reorientation of Pakistan's policy on disputed Kashmir as well, given the fact that the State Department's Oct 5 biennial listing of ''foreign terrorist organisations'' also included a Kashmiri group, Harkatul Mujahideen.
The US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said this group is ''believed to have links to Osama bin Laden''.
On Oct 7, when US President George W Bush called Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to inform him about the impending action against Afghanistan that day, Indian sources said that at Indian urging, Bush told Vajpayee that another Kashmiri group, Jaishe Mohammed, would also be placed on the list of ''foreign terrorist organisations''.
The group is believed to be involved in the car bombing in Srinagar, capital of Indian-held Kashmir, which killed at least 38 people last week.
Such actions by the US government would put pressure on Pakistan's Kashmir policy, which seeks self-determination for Kashmiris in accordance with UN resolutions passed in 1948-49.
This is despite Musharraf having underlined at his press talk, referring to India's efforts in this regard, that ''Kashmir cannot be identified with terrorism''.
During this crisis, apart from change in direction of parts of Pakistan's foreign policy, a new balance of political power seems to be emerging in Pakistan.
Two factions
Religious parties are violently opposing the military regime's alliance with the US, while moderate and mainstream opposition parties are siding with Musharraf, who has also reshuffled his core military team by promoting two four-star generals and changing the head of Pakistan's key security agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).
Elsewhere in the region, the US has suddenly discovered new allies in Russia, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and improved relations with China which President Bush is to visit on Oct 20 and softened its attitude toward Iran. For the first time ever, Russia has encouraged a US military presence in Central Asia.
US Secretary of State Colin Powell is also expected to visit Pakistan and India in a delicate diplomatic balancing act between the two traditional rivals.
This is not the only area where question marks arise.
US support for the Northern Alliance has to be balanced with Pakistan's aversion to it. As Musharraf said Monday, ''The Northern Alliance must not be allowed to take mileage out of it (the US attack on Afghanistan)''.
But the US goals are apparently clear and their twin objectives go together: Get Osama and Get the Taliban, with the Northern Alliance acting as American foot soldiers in the vanguard of 'liberating' Afghanistan from the Taliban.
Additionally, Musharraf talks of a ''short, sharp, targeted war'' while the Americans and the British apparently see a ''long, sustained struggle'' that could go on for weeks.
The biggest issue pertains to the Muslim world, save for Pakistan, in the first 18 hours at least, even Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt - key allies of America - had not come out in public support of the US bombing of Afghanistan.
Matters are not helped by widespread popular resentment in Pakistan, reflected in violent street protests in several cities, over these air strikes.
The US may win the military battle in Afghanistan, but at the expense of losing the battle for Muslim hearts and minds unless it is a conflict of a short duration with minimal civilian casualties and concurrent political initiatives like support for Palestinian rights.


Are you sure you want to delete this comment?
This action cannot be undone.