(IPS) analysis

The Taliban's retreat from Kabul and the capture of Afghanistan's capital by the Northern Alliance on Nov 13 is the most significant development in the region since 1979. Then, the Islamic Revolution in Iran ousted the American influence from its closest regional ally and Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan pitched the Red Army against the Afghans in a decade-long conflict.

Twenty-two years later, in a reversal of roles, the United States and Russia are allies jointly supporting the Northern Alliance, together with China, Iran, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and India, a coalition unthinkable only weeks earlier.

Three questions flow from this landmark development. Where does this leave Pakistan, which has been the most active external player in Afghanistan for the last 25 years? What would be the American game plan since the primary objective of the war - capturing Osama bin Laden - is still to be achieved? And how can Afghanistan's future finally be secured in peace?

Pakistan has viewed the recent developments with mixed feelings. At the popular level, particularly among politicians and the press, there is now the debate ''Who Lost Kabul?'' with the implication that the post-Sept 11 Pakistan ditched its friends, the Taliban, only to find their replacement in Islamabad's perceived adversaries, the Northern Alliance.

At the official level, President General Pervez Musharraf would be partially relieved since his gamble of siding with the Americans and ditching the Taliban has paid off, as he went along with what is now apparently the winning side.

Play favourites

This should help defuse some of the political pressures that he faced within Pakistan as the pro-Taliban protests would be likely to lose their initial fervour and momentum particularly when the Taliban were resisting in a resilient manner and now they are in retreat.

However, Pakistani policymakers and the people alike must face up to the fact that the long-standing policy of Pakistan to play favourites and promote a ''friendly government'' in Afghanistan has been an abysmal failure.

Pakistan or, for that matter, the United States, Russia, Iran or India, has no business trying to install a government of their choice in Kabul, a decision which only the Afghan nation, ravaged by war for 22 years, is competent to make.

Pakistan must learn to live with any government that takes over in Kabul, eschewing the tendency to play political favourites, and it should assume that the dictates of geography would over-ride any other consideration. Being neighbours, there will be no choice but to co-exist in a friendly manner.

American objectives have only been partially met. The Taliban are down but not yet out. They remain a military force, albeit, weakened and dispersed but with the capacity to create problems and to destabilise Afghanistan.

And their power base is among Pashtun, the ethnic majority within Afghanistan's 25 million population which is hardly represented in the Northern Alliance, which straddles the divide cutting across into Pakistan where 20 million Pashtun reside in two of its provinces bordering Afghanistan.

American military success has been coupled with a concurrent political failure: the inability to cobble a viable broad-based political alternative to the Taliban, although they had some six weeks to do so. This failure, which carries within it the seeds of future instability and conflict, is similar to what the Americans did in 1989 when the Red Army was removed from Afghanistan without creating a new post-Soviet regime and the political vacuum led to an internecine civil war in Afghanistan.

Political vacuum

Now that the Northern Alliance has entered Kabul, just as when the Red Army exited from Kabul in 1989, a similar political vacuum is in place.

The US has still three daunting tasks immediately ahead: Decimating the Taliban militarily so that they pose no threat to the American-propped New Order; tracking Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network; and mending fences between the Northern Alliance and Pakistan, a role that Iran and Turkey, two Muslim backers of the Northern Alliance but friendly towards Pakistan as well, are keen to play.

Regarding Afghanistan's future, the United Nations needs to play an effective and urgent role to defuse tensions by organizing a Peace-Keeping Force that can oversee the transition within Afghanistan. There is already talk of Muslim countries like Turkey, Bangladesh and Indonesia contributing to such a force, which would be followed by forging a genuinely broad-based government.

Ironically, the international community has thus far failed in this respect, with political progress towards the goal of a government that is representative still elusive despite numerous public relations exercises.

There are no less than four special envoys who have been shuttling back and forth in this regard but to what end? The United Nations has two: Francesco Venderell and Lakhdar Brahimi, and the United States also has two: Richard Haass and James Dobbins, the latter dubbed as special envoy to the Afghan Opposition. He arrived in Islamabad on Nov 14 after meeting former King Zahir Shah in Rome.

Humanitarian relief

Top priority needs to be accorded to three tracks simultaneously: a UN Peacekeeping Force to maintain stability and provide internal security similar to what the UN did in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor so that human rights violations and retribution by winners against the losers are prevented; diplomatic efforts to cobble a transitional but broad-based regime that enjoys confidence of both the people and neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, and humanitarian relief, given that almost seven million Afghans could face starvation in the winter plus relief for five million refugees based in Pakistan and Iran.

Muslim countries, grouped in the 57-nation Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) need to pitch in with financial support at this hour of need for fellow Muslims. In any case, their role in the current crisis has been that of a virtual non-player, even a non-factor other than acquiescing meekly to whatever Washington did, including the massive bombing that led to so many civilian casualties.

Ironically, the protests in the West were stronger than those in the Muslim world. Rather than being reactive, the Muslim world needs to be pro-active, on an issue that concerns Muslims.

The present challenge provides an opportunity as well to refashion Afghanistan's future in peace given that stakes for all the outside players, notably the United States and Pakistan, are so high. Only then will there be light at the end of the long dark Afghan tunnel.